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ABSTRACT
Investment Criteria and Financing Education
for Economic Development
There are economic criteria that are relevant to finding efficient and
equitable human resource investment strategies, and to avoiding the perverse
incentives that frequently generate major inefficiencies in education and wide
variations in expenditure per pupil.
Sources of inefficiency and inequity include serious underinvestment in
primary and secondary education many developing countries as reflected in high
social rates of return relative to higher education and relative to physical capital.
Inefficiencies in higher education include relatively high subsidies and prolonged
degree programs, as well as high costs due to little use of RA's and TA's.
Inequities include exclusion of children from poor families at all levels. Rates of
return are presented based on micro economic data, and also on estimates from
Cobb-Douglas and Nested CES production fractions.
It is concluded that improving the methods of financing could do a great
deal to improve the incentives for efficiency, and to reduce inequity.

Investment Criteria and Financing
Education for Economic Development
Walter W. McMahon
Both the level and the methods of financing human resource de-
velopment are vital to economic development. It is important that the
levels of financing be efficient—neither so high that diminishing
returns set in, nor so low relative to other forms of investment or to
consumption that development is retarded. But it is important also
that the methods not contain perverse incentives so that efficiency
within the schools and universities is low and funds are wasted. It
is important also that the funds are not distributed so unequally
among pupils that motivated and talented young people from poor fami-
lies are denied access and denied reasonable equality of educational
opportunity.
With so much at stake, it is unfortunate that the total resources
that are available for economic development which are especially
limited in the poor countries are used so inefficiently, and that the
distribution of access to education is so unequal. The problems are
particularly acute in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia where the
needs are greatest in the sense that one of the best potentials for
development there lies in their relatively large and seriously under-
developed human resource base. Inequality in the income distribution
there also tends to be greater. But inefficiency rooted largely in
the levels and methods of financing education is not conducive to
their rapid development, and the inequity in the financing mechanisms
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perpetuates inequality in the distribution of income into future
generations.
But there are problems in the U.S. as well, where there is concern
about inefficiency in the secondary schools, slowing productivity
growth, excessive variation in the expenditure per pupil depending on
the wealth in each neighborhood, and about the loss of international
competitiveness which depends on human capital intensive exports.
There are economic investment criteria which are useful for de-
termining the inefficiency of the level and types of investment made,
just as there are in the private sector, but they often are not ap-
plied. Furthermore, the methods of financing used often contain
incentives that permit or encourage inefficiencies, some of which are
beginning to be addressed by the World Bank, USAID, and some other
donors. These include underinvestment in primary education, which is
well-known to contribute dramatically to growth, relative to higher
education which in many developing countries is inefficient and too
costly. Other sources of inefficiency aggravated by the methods of
financing include high drop-out rates in basic education, high
repetition rates, low pupil achievement, and short tirae-on-task
caused by short school days. In higher education in developing coun-
tries, inefficiencies include insufficient use of graduate students as
teaching assistants and research assistants, which denies them the
learning experience, makes higher education more costly, and limits
the diffusion of the new technology to undergraduates and to outside
employments, and 5, 6, or 7 years to finish 4 years degree programs.
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The methods of financing are also perverse as they relate to
equity. There are extremely wide variations in expenditure per pupil
between urban and rural areas, and a noticeable lack of wealth
neutrality as between pupils in high-income and low-income areas.
This is particularly severe in Brazil, in many nations in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in Pakistan and Nepal, for example. It is not conducive
to economic development in the provinces and rural areas, and per-
petuates inequality.
This paper will consider the level and the methods of financing
human resource development in the developing countries with some com-
parisons to the United States and other industrial countries. It will
draw for documentation on those aspects relating to finance in a
series of recent background papers dealing with basic and higher edu-
cation in Latin America (McMahon, 1989b), in the United States
(McMahon, 1989c, 1989d, 1989e), in Africa (McMahon, 1988a, 1988b,
1989f), in Pakistan (McMahon, 1989g) , in Nepal (McMahon, 1988c), in
Indonesia (McMahon, 1986, 1989h), and in the O.E.C.D. countries
(McMahon, 1984). Part II will go beyond the positive analysis with a
normative analysis that defines and applies the efficiency criteria
and equity criteria to the level and methods used in financing human
resource development in a sample of these countries, and considers
major policy options. Part III summarizes the conclusions about
methods that are available for improving the decisions about financing
in the effort to reduce the inefficiency and inequity that exists at
present.
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I. Methods of Financing Human Resource
Development: A Brief Description
The financing of investment in education, and in health, is shared
by parents, by their children, by government, and in the case of the
developing countries, by the World Bank, and various donors.
Parents
From an economic point of view, the largest investment being made
which includes the value of the time invested, usually measured by the
earnings foregone while the child is in school, is made by the parents.
This foregone earnings cost is borne entirely by the parents at the
primary and secondary levels, and there are sometimes additional fees
for books, uniforms, and teachers' supplements. So parents bear a
much larger percentage of the total investment costs than is commonly
realized out of their income. This foregone earnings cost is a major
contributing factor to the high drop-out rates after about fifth grade
in most developing countries, especially in the rural areas, and a
major explanation of the high illiteracy rates in the labor force.
In higher education, these maintenance costs are much more heavily
subsidized in developing countries than they are in the U.S. Resource
recovery is very low in higher education in Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Uruguay, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and all of the coun-
tries in Africa except Nigeria (for data see McMahon, 1988d and 1989b).
In Africa even secondary school boarding costs are subsidized. These
large higher education subsidies occur even though 60-83% of the stu-
dents typically come from the highest income families. (See World
Bank, 1986, p. 61.) This method of financing results in an enormous
i
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cost per student in higher (and African secondary) education, and the
loss of considerable potential for resource recovery from parents who
are able to pay amounts that then would be available for further
expansion of higher education. In Brazil, for example, higher educa-
tion costs per student are 18 times what they are at the primary
level, compared to 10 times primary in all of Latin America, 2 times
primary in the U.S. and in the industrial countries, and 53 times
primary in Sub-Saharan Africa. (See the World Bank, 1988.)
This over participation of parents in the financing of primary and
junior secondary education where the social rates of return are higher
and insufficient participation by those higher income parents who have
the ability to support higher education encourages inefficiency. At
the primary and secondary levels, the relatively high costs to the
parents is associated with the high drop-out and repetition rates.
In higher education, the subsidized maintenance and free tuition tends
to lengthen the time it takes a typical student to graduate, which
runs up the costs. It takes &1/2 years to finish a 4-year degree in
Indonesia, for example, and longer than that in Greece and some coun-
tries in Africa. (See McMahon, Millot, and Eng, 1986, p. 196.)
Students
Students bear a portion of the costs in all of the industrialized
countries and a few of the developing countries through student loans
and work-study.
Student loans accounted for $10.4 billion of U.S. Federal student
aid in 1987, compared to $1.5 billion subsidy plus earnings from work
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study, and $4.2 billion in direct grants. The average loan was $2,478,
average earnings from work study was $880, and the average Pell Grant
was $1,312, with 31% of the 12.4 million students enrolled holding
loans and 29% receiving Pell Grants. (Source: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1988, p. 147.) Student loans are used extensively in Sweden,
Canada, and Korea, and are available in Norway, Japan, Columbia,
Venezuela, and Argentina. New student loan programs are now being
underwritten by the World Bank in Jamaica and some other places.
Studies of the experience with student loan and grant programs
generally conclude three things:
1. Tuition waivers and maintenance grants should all be targeted
more adequately to the students from poor families who are
the ones who need them by use of means tests.
2. The same is true of access to student loans, because loan
programs are usually heavily subsidized, and because higher
income families can use the funds for other purposes.
3. A combination of loans, tuition waivers, work-study, and
grants is a more flexible system of student aid than is a
student aid program that contains only one of these. (See
Woodhall, 1987, p. 449.)
At the Masters' and Ph.D. levels, parents seldom support either
tuition and fees or maintenance costs. Most graduate students in the
U.S. finance these costs themselves by means of half-time teaching and
research assistantships. This practice is less common in the European
countries or in developing countries where usually full-time faculty
and full-time research assistants are used. There is increasing
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awareness Chat his latter practice limits access due to the higher
costs, and limits diffusion of the technology since trained full-time
research assistants do not interact with undergraduates or flow through
into Industry.
Government Financing
About 60% of the total investment in education, and 85% of the
institutional expenditure is borne by the central government in most
countries, and by state and local governments in the U.S. The
remainder of the institutional costs are accounted for by the private
sector, which accounts for only 10-20% of the primary and secondary
students in each geographical region throughout the world, and by
tuition and fees at public institutions (World Bank, 1988, p. 134).
The private sector tends to grow more rapidly when public schools are
underfinanced and do not meet the needs.
This dominance of the public sector is the prevailing pattern
because there is market failure, with the private market failing to
provide education in sufficient quantities. There are three basic
reasons for this. A major one is that families cannot borrow suf-
ficient suras to finance human resource development, even though the
rates of return on educational investment are higher, a capital market
failure due to the uncertainty of future earnings and insufficient
collateral. (See Ritzen, 1989, and McMahon, 1989a and 1989c, for
analytic proofs and empirical research results.) A second reason for
public sector financing is that there are externalities, or spillover
benefits to the society that the parents who otherwise would have to
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do all of the financing are unable to perceive or to recoup. A third
reason is that the poor would remain uneducated, or insufficiently
educated, as the private sector "skims" the market, unless there is
public financing.
Once government does intervene, its financing induces further
saving and investing of foregone earnings and fees by parents. The
government's financing role in determining the total level and types
of investment in education therefore is the major determining one and
is crucial (see McMahon, 1989c, for the two relevant models and
empirical tests).
The result is that the government can apply appropriate economic
investment criteria in the form of cost/benefit and rate of return
analysis to ensure that the total level of investment (financed by
parents, students, and taxes) and the investment made at primary,
secondary, and higher education levels is economically efficient.
However, it is also the responsibility of the government, since
investment in human beings is involved (in contrast to private invest-
ment in machines which can be driven only by efficiency considerations)
to see that the investment is equitable. Education cannot be provided
only to the children of the wealthy, who can pay for private schools
or be an influential pressure group distorting expenditure per child
upward in wealthy suburbs and downward in rural areas and urban
ghettoes. This might be viewed as instance of "public sector failure,"
as pressure groups distort education expenditure to their own ends.
The result is a breakdown of "wealth neutrality," which is a frequent
subject of litigation in U.S. courts (see Cohn, 1979, pp. 270-86).
-9-
It also involves a lack of horizontal equity, a widely accepted prin-
ciple in public finance, in this case as among children at the same
level in different schools, and leads to inequality of educational
opportunity.
It is fortunate that in financing human resource development the
directions indicated by efficiency criteria and by equity criteria in
many important situations are not in conflict. For example, if there
is diminishing returns to expenditure per pupil, a certain amount of
equalization increases the total returns. In another important dimen-
sion, rates of return to primary education tend to be higher than they
are to higher education, and primary education benefits the poorest
segment of the population as well. For example, rates of return to
primary education in Latin America are 26-27%, compared to higher
education, and 51-59% of the benefits of public primary education go
to the poorest 40% of the population. (Sources shown in McMahon,
1988d, Table 4, and World Bank, 1986, p. 61.) So this is a case where
an improvement in efficiency by increasing financing faster for
primary education where the rates of return are higher simultaneously
increases equity.
International Donors
In the developing countries, the World Bank, Asian and Latin
American Development Banks, and national donors have made large sector
loans and grants to governments to assist with the financing of human
resource development. These transfers have usually stressed those
areas where there is a comparative advantage to assistance from the
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industrialized countries, such as higher education and graduate study
abroad where there is an additional advantage to be gained from the
transfer of technology. Sometimes they have supported activities
where the cost effectiveness is known to be relatively lower (e.g.,
excessive expansion of vocational education in Latin America and
South Asia, or too much emphasis on buildings in relation to texts
and teaching materials which are known to be more cost effective).
(See Fuller, 1988, for a good survey of cost effectiveness as it re-
lates to pupil achievement.) This leaves the government in the de-
veloping country with the task of "topping up" the education budget
from its own tax sources so that the efficiency and equity of the en-
tire budget is not distorted by this action by donors. Unfortunately
this is a task that often has not been performed.
More recently, a great deal more emphasis is being placed by major
donors on achieving greater efficiency and equity in human resource
investments. Large education sector loans have been made by the World
Bank to expand primary education in Pakistan, African nations, and
elsewhere. Policy reform requiring more resource recovery in higher
education and means tested student loans and grants have also been
imposed as a condition of higher education loans in Indonesia,
Jamaica, Morocco, and elsewhere (see Jiminez, 1989). A large USAID
grant to Pakistan, and one in preparation to Bangladesh, finances
investment in primary education, as will the forthcoming USAID
project ABLE worldwide.
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II. Investment Criteria in Financing Education
The types of taxes used in support of the government's contribu-
tion are largely irrelevant to the operation of the system of financ-
ing education. Some taxes may be preferred to others, however, for
various reasons. Also, the relevance of various kinds of resource
recovery from families in the financing of higher education has
already been discussed.
The major tax sources in use used to support education all have
some degree of income elasticity. An exception is the very regressive
"house-tax" that is a poll tax not based on the value of the house or
land used in Nepal and in Africa. Real expenditure per capita on
education rises when income rises, either because the revenue base is
income elastic or if it is not, as is the case with sales taxes or
property taxes in the U.S., the rates are changed. (For regressions
that establish this, see McMahon, 1971.) The income elasticity of
government investment in education is 1.0 in the U.S. in the long run,
and 1.4 to 1.6 in a cross section of 89 low, middle, and higher-
income countries (McMahon, 1989c, and T. Paul Schultz, 1988).
What is important on efficiency grounds to the financing of edu-
cation is the percent of the government budget allocated to education.
This influences the amounts invested by families, and thereby deter-
mines the total percent of GNP invested in human resource development.
What is also important on both efficiency and equity grounds is
the method by which the funds are distributed to the schools. Both of
these steps inherently contain a set of incentives; the former to
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farailles to save and invest in education, and the latter to the method
of operation of the schools.
Efficient Levels of Investment in Education
Are countries investing too much or too little in education, or
are they balancing it with the rate of investment in physical capital
and thereby employing an overall efficient investment strategy for
growth?
Table 1 shows that investment strategies are not very efficient
—
differences in rates of return that persist over long periods of time
and in many countries. There is clearly underinvestment in primary
education in Latin America, Africa, and Asia where real rates of
return average 16-44%, compared to about a 13% rate of return to
investment in physical capital. The social rates of return to invest-
ment in higher education are less advantageous, but still substantial.
Comparing recent estimates in Indonesia and Pakistan, there are
high 33% rates of return available to financing primary education
there, whereas the returns are highest in Indonesia at 22% for the
junior secondary level (from McMahon, 1989g and 1989h). This is not
surprising when one considers the 74% illiteracy in the labor force in
Pakistan, suggesting a relative shortage of workers with even primary
school basic skills. In contrast, as shown in Figure 1 in Indonesia,
60% of the labor force has completed primary. With only 6% having
completed junior secondary, this corresponds to the higher 22% rate
of return available there. It is fortunate that both the World Bank
and USAID have each made very large $250-500 million commitments each
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Table 1
Evidence on Rates of Return to Human and Physical Capital
Latin America
Africa
Asia
Indonesia"
Pakistan
Industrial
United States d
Canada
Japan
Sweden
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Developing^
Industrial^
Sources: a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Primary
44%
29
16
14
33
Education Physical Capital
Secondary Higher Overalls
17% 18% 13
17 12 13
12 11 13
22 9
3 10
10 9 Industry Housing
12 12 15% e 5% e
11.7 14 9.9 f
4.6 6.4 13.
6
f
10.5 9.2 5.5*
3.6 8.2 5.9*
5.2 5.5 28.
3
f
Education Physical Capital
15 13
9 11
Social rates of return from Psacharopoulos (1981, pp.
328-29).
McMahon (1989h, Table 7) (for 1986).
McMahon (1989g).
McMahon (1989d, Table 1).
E. Mills (1988).
T. P. Hill (1979, p. 23). This is the trend level for
1976 for industry including transport, i.e., adjusted
to remove cyclical effects.
Psacharopoulos (1985, p. 591).
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to expanding primary education in Pakistan, and that Indonesia has
made the attainment of universal junior secondary education by 1993
the major human resource investment goal of its new five-year plan.
Both would appear to be economically efficient investment strategies.
It should be stressed that the rates of return to investment in
rural education at the primary level are very high, working out to
about 27% on the average in studies covering 35 countries. Since a
very large percentage of the low-income population is in the rural
areas, this means that expansion of primary education in the rural
areas is not only an efficient strategy, but it also improves equity.
(For a survey of the studies of the effect of education on agricul-
tural productivity, see M. E. Lockheed, 1987, pp. 110-115.)
The purely economic returns to the education of women tend to be
as high or higher than to the education of men. Psacharopoulos
(1985, p. 589) estimates 15% returns to the education of women, and
11% to men, with the largest advantage to women at the secondary
level. But there is an additional effect, very important in the low-
income countries where population growth rates are very high, averaging
2.8% per year in the developing countries compared to .6% in the
industrial countries (Source: McMahon, 1989c, Table 1). It is the
effect of education of women to the ninth grade level and beyond in
enabling them to enter the labor force as teachers, for example, as
this in turn lowers fertility rates and the size of completed families
(see McMahon, 1989g, for a survey of the studies as they relate to
Pakistan). This is another instance where efficiency in financing and
equity are not in conflict.
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Education and Growth
Rates of return can be derived directly from a production function
and then estimated directly with increments to output or to real
gross national product on the left. This circumvents arguments about
whether or not average earnings are a reasonably good measure of
worker productivity, and arguments about self-selection and screening.
When this was done for the U.S., using a Cobb-Douglas production
function, the real marginal productivities of each type of investment
interpreted as real rates of return that were obtained are as follows:
(!) y = .35 -+ .13 — + .27 J*=!+ .30 -^-
P (.44) Y (12.2) Y (3.8) Y (3.1) Y
I 2
_
.29 -^ - .002D,
(3.4) l (1.6) * 98
where y = rate of growth of real potential GNP
,
NS = labor supply,
I„ = investment in physical capital,
I„ = investment in primary and secondary education,
I, investment in research and development,
I„_ = investment in higher education,
D = dummy variable for oil shocks, 1 after 1979,
Y = real gross national product.
Investment in education and in R&D was lagged 5 and 7 years respec-
tively to allow for delayed effects, and the production function was
estimated for 1947-1988 as part of a simultaneous 35 equation model to
J
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allow for feedback effects as income grows on all of the four differ-
ent forms of investment. t statistics are shown in parentheses.
These estimates suggest a 13% real rate of return to investment in
physical capital, not far from the 15% for non-housing capital and 5%
for housing capital obtained by Ed Mills (1988) as an average over the
1947-1984 period shown in Table I. The regression estimates also sug-
gest about a 27% rate of return to investment improving the quality
and access to primary and secondary education. The coefficients of
.30 for I and -.29 for I u „ are interdependent with one another, withA HE * '
I„
F sometimes becoming positive and I negative, so it was not pos-
sible to separately identify these two effects. In earlier work,
using a similar production function with data for 39 African countries,
a negative coefficient for higher education also was obtained. But
its net effect became positive after I was introduced with a longer
rib
10 year lag (McMahon, 1987, p. 189, which also shows the derivation of
rates of return from a Cobb-Douglas function).
There is evidence that physical capital substitutes for and dis-
places raw labor, but that education embodied in human capital and
physical capital are complementary with one another. This difference
in elasticities of substitution can be accommodated in a Nested
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, and the
rates of return then derived. The nested CES shown as equation (2)
below was estimated for the U.S. using the same data, although it is
highly non-linear and could not be estimated as part of the simultan-
eous macrodynamic model. The results were as follows:
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-1.31
-1.31 -1/1.31
(2) Y = [ .97 Z (8
* 4)
+ .03 (e atNS) (8 * 4) ] (8 * 4)
(120.3) (120.3)
-3.46 -3.46
-3.46 -1/3.46
Z-[ .91 K (6 ' 71) + .09 H(6 ' 7l) + .01 HE (6 ' 71) ] (6 ' 71)
(29.1) (2.67) (2.67)
R
2
= .998; DW = 1.92, Rho = .57
(3.59)
where: Y = real potential GNP,
Z = the combined factor,
K = physical capital,
H = human capital (primary and secondary),
HE = human capital (higher education)
NS = labor supply, the number of workers, and
a = rate of growth of the R&D stock.
Technical change is regarded here as embodied as the result of past
investment In both physical (K) and human capital (H and HE) , but also
containing a disembodied component that is raw-labor-augraenting via
e
at
NS.
The elasticity of substitution calculated from the estimates above
is higher (s = .43) for the substitution of total capital (Z) for
raw labor (NS) than it is for substitution among the different forms
of human and physical capital (s = .22). This is as expected.
The rates of return derived as shown in Appendix A and calculated
from the estimates of Eq. (2) are:
r
K
=
.11, r
R
=
.14, rRE
= .09
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This 11% rate of return for physical capital, 1974-88, is remarkably
close to the average of the 15% and 5% for Non-Housing and Housing
capital that as mentioned earlier was obtained by Ed Mills (1988) and
shown in Table 1. The 14% for primary and secondary and 9% for higher
education is close to the 12% reported for secondary education alone
in Table 1 and the 10.5 to 10.9% reported for the earlier 1949-1969
period for higher education by Psacharopoulos (1981). These latter
estimates are based on microeconoraic earnings data, which therefore
are strengthened by these aggregate production function estimates.
This suggests that there is a degree of inefficiency in the sense
that there is underinvestment in primary and secondary education (and
overinvestment in housing) in the U.S. It also suggests that there is
not overinvestment in human capital in the U.S.
Fast Growth
As shown in Table 2, the six fastest growing countries in the world
who all had real growth rates that were sustained at 4.7 to 7.8% since
1965 are all investing between 18-21% of their total government
budgets in education. (In Japan, provincial governments raise some
money for education that is not included in Table 2.) But they also
are saving and investing in physical capital at a high 29% average
rate. Their investment financing strategy that takes into account the
complementarity between human and physical capital and invests at
relatively high rates in each does seem to work. The inequality in
the distribution of income in these fastest growing countries is rela-
tively low compared to most developing countries. This is probably
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Table 2
What Works and What Doesn'
t
Fastest Growi ng Re;al Per Income
Countries in Capita Growth VY
47%
IH/G
21.6%
Received by
the World Rate 1965-85
7.8%
Lowest 40%
Singapore NA
South Korea 6.6% 29% 20.5% 16.9%
Hong Kong 6.2% 24% 20% 16.2%
Botswana 6.2% 21% 19.4% NA
Taiwan 4.9% 28% 18.0% 22.3%
Japan 4.7% 28% 12.0% 21.9%
Three Slow Growing
Countries
Pakistan
Philippines
Nepal
2.4%
2.6%
.2%
17% 3.1%
18% 25.6%
10% 7.2%
NA
NA
NA
Source: Data from World Bank (1988, Statistical Appendices).
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partly because high rates of investment in primary and secondary
education have made basic education universal in all of these coun-
tries except Botswana and thereby spread earnings more widely in the
population.
In addition, the Philippines had very high rates of investment in
education (25.6%) and Pakistan and Nepal had very low rates of invest-
ment in education (3.1% and 7.2%). Per capita growth was higher in
the Philippines than in Pakistan or Nepal, but was basically much
lower in all three of these countries than in the faster growing
countries shown at the top of Table 2. There are of course other
factors that affect growth (wars, the degree of political commitment
to achieve efficient growth, an export-oriented growth strategy,
etc.). But perhaps this is sufficient to illustrate that investment
in education is not a sufficient condition for growth, but it does
appear to be a necessary condition.
III. Conclusions
There are many sources of inefficiency, as well as inequity, in
education that then transpose themselves into the pattern of economic
development. Many of these are rooted in the methods of financing
human resource development.
It is suggested that there are economic criteria that are relevant
to finding efficient and equitable human resource investment strate-
gies. The social rates of return to investment in education, espe-
cially in primary and secondary education, tend to be significantly
higher than the rates of return to investment in physical capital in
-22-
the developing countries, and over twice the real rates of return to
investment in housing in the U.S. Assuming that the externality bene-
fits of education exceed the cost spillovers, and that the contribu-
tion made by investment in primary and secondary education to reducing
inequality in the distribution of income in the future is non-negative,
there are significant efficiency and equity gains to be made especially
in the developing countries by improving investment strategies. Beyond
this, improving the objectivity and equity with which funds are dis-
tributed by the Central Government to the schools, and increasing
resource recovery in higher education while improving the targeting
of financial aids through better means testing, are two specific addi-
tional ways the financing of human resource development could be
refined. (See McMahon, 1989b for the specifics.) All of these steps
would increase efficiency and equity in education, and thereby con-
tribute significantly to economic development.
-23-
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Appendix A
Derivation of the Rates of Return
from a Nested CES Production Function
Without the error terms, a nested CES production function is specified by the following two
equations:
YP = \pc\Z- p + a2N- p ]~-p, a!+a2 = l
Z = ea [P\K- p < + /32H- p' + foHE~ PT*, A + #2 + A = 1
Substituting (2) into (1), we have
YP = [a
x
e-
ap
{(3 xK- pl +f32H- p*+(3iHE- p>}» +a2N- p }--p
(1)
(2)
(3)
Let
P = a
x
e-
ap {fi\K- p* +/32H- p ' + f32HE~ p'}^ +a2N~ p = YP-p
and
Q = {fagr* + P2H- p ' + 3HE- p>} = (|)
-Pi
Then, taking the total derivative of (3) with respect to time r, we have
dYP
dt
dYPdK dYPdH dYP dHE dYP ON
~dK~dt
+
~dH~d?
+
dHE dt
+
~dN~dt
liep—
f
a^'Q*?hK-i»+»™ + ai e~ a'Q^ /32H-i»+^
dt dt
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Appendix A (continued)
dK dH
= YPp+l \a vj x e- apiZPt
- pK-^ l)— + a lp2e-ap'ZPl- pH- {p^ )—
dt at
1H3
dt dt
Since
7Pi~P _
Z^~'
(4) becomes
dYP
dt
n nn /YP\ p+l fZ\ pl+l dK „ an (YP\rp p+1 /zy +1 a//
Therfore, the rate of return to physical capital,
/YP\ p+l /Z\ p '+l
*=^-(?) (I) '
the rate of return to basic education,
YP\ p+1 / Z\ Pl+1
Z J \HrH = cube-* (-
the rate of return to higher education,
/YP\ p+l / Z \ Pl+1
(4)
(5)
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